This Appendix contains proofs of results not contained in the paper.
(1 R)A s " dH(").
Under this alternative contract, the consumption of the managers satis…es the nonnegativity constraint. To see this, note that in all states but those in M , we have simply added a positive number a to the managers' consumption. To argue that consumption is positive for states in M , we note that under our contradiction hypothesis, the set N is to the left of M . Since the consumption of the managers in the alternative contract A s " d s + a satis…es nonnegativity for any " 2 N; this same expression clearly satis…es nonnegativity for the region M; which has larger idiosyncratic shocks.
This alternative contract is clearly incentive compatible. For all states besides those in M , we have subtracted o¤ a constant from the repayments of the managers so that the incentive constraints are automatically satis…ed. We have switched M to a nonbankruptcy region, and the only incentive constraint that applies in this region is that the repayments are constant, which is satis…ed by construction. Thus, we have established a contradiction.
Q:E:D:
We now characterize the payments in the optimal contract. Because payments by …rms in say, state L, have no e¤ect on feasible payments in the other state, say state H, it follows that we can analyze the contract in each health state separately, holding …xed the payments in the other state.
We let " s be shorthand for " s (U s ): Any contract that is immune to renegotiation must maximize, say, the payo¤s to the manager subject to the constraint that the …nancial intermediary receives at least d s . Furthermore, Lemma A1 implies that any contract that is immune to renegotiation must be of the form c s (") = A s " d s for " " s : Nonnegativity then implies that (52) d s A s " s for " > " s :
Incentive compatibility requires that (53) c s (") = RA s " d s (") A s " d s for " " s ;
and nonnegativity requires that (54) d s (") RA s " for " " s :
Therefore, any contract that is immune to renegotiation must solve max " s ;ds(");ds
subject to (52), (53), (54), and (55)
The solution to this problem depends on the size of the payments d s owed to the …nancial intermediary. If these payments are low enough, then there is no default, and managers pay a constant amount less than A s "; whereas if these payments are higher, then there is default and payments are as we said. Finally, if d s is too large, then this problem does not have a solution because there is a maximal amount of expected payments d s that can be raised by any contract that satis…es the constraints on this problem.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. It is immediate that a debt-equity contract is immune to renegotiation. We now show that if a contract is immune to renegotiation, it must be a debt-equity contract. To do so, we construct an alternative contract that satis…es (52)-(55) and raises the payo¤s to the manager. This alternative contract has a bankruptcy region [";"]; where
where a is constructed so that it satis…es (55) with equality. Hence, a satis…es We now show that in the alternative contract, the expected consumption of managers is higher than in the original contract. The consumption of the managers in the original contract is given by
and in the alternative contract it is given by (57)
which, using (56), equals c s + R "
"
(1 R)A s " dH("). Since R < 1; the managers'expected payo¤ is strictly higher. Hence, we have proved the desired result for the case that d s > A s ".
Next, consider the case that d s A s ": Clearly, it is feasible to have no bankruptcy and repay the …nancial intermediary d s : Since bankruptcy simply wastes resources, it is optimal to set " s = "; and from (52), d s A s ":
We now show that the managers' and the investors' consumption has the desired form in the bankruptcy region. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
Consider an alternative contract that leaves the bankruptcy set as well as the expected consumption of managers and investors unchanged. This contract reduces the managers' consumption in the bankruptcy set to zero and raises the managers' consumption in the nonbankruptcy interval by an amount that leaves overall expected consumption the same.
Since the bankruptcy region is unchanged, this alternative contract gives the same expected payo¤s to the investors as the original contract but has the property that A s " s > d s : From the …rst step, however, we know that any such contract is strictly dominated by the optimal contract. This gives us a contradiction. Q:E:D:
B. Proving Lemma 1
Proof. We assume throughout that the bankruptcy cuto¤ is interior. First we substitute out for c H using the manager's incentive constraint and drop c H as a choice variable so that the problem becomes (58) max
The Lagrangian for this problem is
where 1 +^ denotes the multiplier on (59), which can be rewritten as
The …rst-order condition for " to this modi…ed problem is
Since c 0 L and y 0 L are both negative and 1 +^ is nonnegative, it follows that^ > 0. Thus, (60) is the Lagrangian of the contract in the desired form. Q:E:D:
Proof. Clearly, the bailout authority's objective function (26) is maximized by setting " b = " so that no bankruptcies occur. For any cuto¤ " R of the representative …rm, this outcome is achieved by making an o¤er d b = d (" R ) and setting a new bankruptcy cuto¤
Firms will accept such an o¤er since the …nancial intermediary and managers are made better o¤ by doing so. Thus, in any equilibrium, the outcomes di¤er from the e¢ cient outcomes and are therefore ine¢ cient.
To show that " R > " in any equilibrium, suppose by way of contradiction that " R = " so that b = 0. Then we will show that the voluntary acceptance constraint (32) is violated at ": To see this result, note that it is optimal for an individual …rm to deviate to the e¢ cient contract x CE ; which has " CE > ". Since the associated debt payments d(" CE ) > d("); the …nancial intermediary will reject the bailout authority's o¤er and the e¢ cient contract will be implemented, contradicting that " R = ". Since " R > "; taxes are positive in any equilibrium.
In order to show that if (32) holds as a strict inequality, we have a continuum of equilibria, note that both the left and right sides of (32) are continuous functions of " R and that the inequality is violated at " R = ": Thus, there is some value of " R at which (32) holds with equality. Let " min denote the largest value of " R such that (32) holds with equality.
Then any " R 2 [" min ; " max ] is part of an equilibrium. Note that if a …rm deviates to a lower bankruptcy cuto¤ than " R ; this …rm will accept the bailout with payments d b = d (" R ) to the …nancial intermediary and bankruptcy cuto¤ " and therefore will receive the same payo¤ as under the representative contract. Thus, no such deviation is pro…table. Clearly, it is not optimal for any …rm to deviate to a higher bankruptcy cuto¤. Since no deviations are pro…table, any " R 2 [" min ; " max ] is part of an equilibrium. Q:E:D:
Proof. Suppose …rst that the outcomes (x t ; t ) are those of a bailout equilibrium.
Since the contracting problem is static, these outcomes must solve the one-period contracting problem. Clearly, in any equilibrium the government budget constraint is satis…ed. Next, we
show that under our assumption on the severity of trigger strategies (38), they must satisfy the sustainability constraint. To see why, suppose by way of contradiction that in equilibrium these outcomes violate the sustainability constraint (39). Then the authority, by setting the bankruptcy set to be empty in the current period, obtains current payo¤s equal to the …rst term on the right side of (39), and under (38), its continuation payo¤ is at least as large as the last term. Thus, outcomes that violate the sustainability constraint contradict optimality by the bailout authority.
Suppose, next, that a set of candidate equilibrium outcomes (x t ;^ t ) with associated historyĤ t satisfy (i); (ii); and (iii) of Proposition 4. We will construct revert-to-static strategies that support these outcomes as an equilibrium. For private agents, these strategies specify that if the history H t =Ĥ t ; then the contract x t equals the desired onex t ; otherwise, the contract x t equals the full bailout contract x b : For the bailout authority, these strategies specify that if H t =Ĥ t ; then the policies equal the desired ones^ t ; otherwise, they equal the full bailout policy of purchasing all the debt in the distressed state and eliminating all the bankruptcies. Now consider the bailout authority. If there has been no deviation from these speci…ed outcomes in or before period t; in that H t =Ĥ t ; then the payo¤s associated with choosing the desired policy^ t are given by the left side of the sustainability constraint. The payo¤s associated with any deviation are smaller than the right side of the sustainability constraint because the …rst term on the right side represents the best one-shot deviation. The inequality in (39) guarantees that the desired policies are indeed optimal. If there has been a deviation in or before t; so that H t 6 =Ĥ t ; then the continuation payo¤s of the bailout authority are independent of the current policy. Hence, the bailout authority's optimal choice is the statically optimal full bailout policy.
Clearly, the private agent's strategies are optimal by construction. Q:E:D:
Proof. To prove the …rst part of the proposition, suppose that by way of contradiction that < but no bailouts occur in that " bt = " Rt and t = 0. That taxes are zero implies
. By de…nition of , the surplus in any period t is strictly less than the surplus under commitment, so that the commitment outcomes are not sustainable. Thus " bt 6 = " CE . We will show since t = 0, it is optimal for the …rm to choose the commitment outcome anticipating that it will reject the bailout o¤er. To see this result, suppose …rst
If the …rm chooses the commitment outcome the value of the surplus will be strictly higher than in the purported equilibrium and the …nancial intermediary will reject the bailout o¤er so that the commitment outcome will be implemented. Suppose next that " bt > " CE . Then the …rm can choose the commitment outcome, raise the surplus, and the manager will reject the bailout o¤er.
To show that the outcome is sustainably ine¢ cient, note that if t is positive the (k; p) decisions are distorted for the same reasons they are in the one-period model. Q:E:D:
Proof of …rst part. We will show that the best orderly resolution outcome has zero taxes. Since taxes are strictly positive in the best bailout outcome, the two outcomes di¤er.
Since the bailout outcome is feasible under orderly resolution, the orderly resolution outcome yields strictly higher surplus.
To show that the best orderly resolution outcome has zero taxes, consider a modi…ed version of the orderly resolution problem in which we hold all future allocations …xed and only vary the current allocations. This modi…cation implies that we keep the continuation value V t+1 …xed while we vary the period t allocations. Clearly, if for any V t+1 the best allocations at t have zero taxes, then so does the allocations in all periods. Here, by way of contradiction, we allow for positive bailouts in that " b < " O so that the implemented bankruptcy cuto¤ is " b . The modi…ed problem can be written as
where " b " O . Here we have substituted out the government budget constraint into (27) and (29) to obtain (61) and (63).
Since (61) holds with equality, g(k) = k implies that f = k 1 and f g 0 = so that (63) can be written as
which implicitly de…nes the e¤ort function p(" b ; " O ), which, importantly, does not depend on k. We later show in Lemma A2 that under our assumptions on v(p), the e¤ort function is decreasing in " O . From the implementability constraint (61) written as
it follows that if, as we show later, f p is negative, then reducing " O reduces k by reducing e¤ort.
Now suppose by way of contradiction that it is optimal to have " O > " b ; so that there are taxes in equilibrium. Consider reducing " O . This reduction increases e¤ort and, since e¤ort is below the full information level, raises surplus. This variation relaxes the sustainability constraint because e¤ort rises and k falls, thus making it possible to raise welfare and thereby establishing the contradiction.
To establish that f p < 0, note that the …rst-order condition with respect to " O is
where and are the multipliers on the implementability and sustainability constraints, which are both positive. Since e¤ort is below the full information level, U p is positive. Clearly, the last term in brackets is positive. It follows that f p is negative. Q:E:D:
We turn now to our lemma.
Lemma A2. Under our su¢ cient conditions (42), the partial derivative @p(
Proof. The e¤ort function p(
To show that the relevant partial derivative of e¤ort is negative, take the total derivative of (64) to get
Next, we will show that M p , N p , and @N=@" O are all positive, to obtain the desired result.
To show that M p is positive, we rewrite M as
so that M p has the same sign as
which under (42) has the same sign as
To see that N p and @N=@" O are positive, note that
Next, note that sincef p is clearly decreasing in " O , it follows that @N=@" O is positive. Since a 1, pv 00 (p) is increasing in p and sincef p is decreasing in p; it follows that N p is positive. It thus follows from (65) that @p(" b ; " O )=@" O .
Q:E:D:
Proof of second part. We …rst show a preliminary result that we use in proving the main result: if 0 < < ; the sustainably e¢ cient outcome has bankruptcies. To see this result, suppose by way of contradiction that the sustainably e¢ cient outcome has no bankruptcies. Then there is no static gain to canceling bankruptcies, so the …rst terms on the left and right sides of the sustainability constraint (39) are the same. The continuation payo¤s are strictly greater than the full bailout continuation payo¤s, however, so that the sustainability constraint holds as a strict inequality. This is a contradiction since in any sustainably e¢ cient outcome below commitment, the sustainability constraint binds.
We now show that the orderly resolution outcome is sustainably ine¢ cient. Consider the outcomes of an orderly resolution equilibrium denoted (k O ; " O ; p O ) in some particular period t. Consider the alternative allocations that alter period t outcomes, but let future outcomes coincide with those of the given orderly resolution equilibrium. These alternative allocations at time t maximize surplus subject to the implementability constraint and the sustainability constraint except that here the continuation surplus V in the sustainability constraint is the surplus associated with the given orderly resolution equilibrium. Since the original outcomes satisfy the sustainability constraint, it is clear that (k O ; " O ; p O ) is feasible for the alternative maximization problem. We have dropped the combined (k; p) …rst order condition (43) at time t, so it is clear that surplus in the alternative allocation is weakly higher than in the orderly resolution equilibrium. Clearly, since the sustainability constraint binds and the sustainably e¢ cient outcome has bankruptcies, the …rst-order conditions for this alternative allocation with respect to " and k will not satisfy the …rst-order conditions with respect " and k in an orderly resolution equilibrium. Since the sustainably e¢ cient outcome yields even higher welfare than the alternative allocations, it follows that the orderly resolution outcome is sustainably ine¢ cient. Q:E:D:
G. Setup and Proof of Proposition 8
Setup: We begin by deriving the objective function in (45) and the implementability constraint with taxes and transfers (46), both reproduced here:
To derive these letc H g(k) andc L (" )g(k) denote the expected payments from the …rm to the manager so that the expected consumption of the manager in the two states, inclusive of the transfer T , is given by
The objective function (66) is immediate: the sum of manager and the investor's utilities is increased by the lump sum transfer T and reduced by the tax k. The implementability constraint is given by
Substituting forc H andc L (" ) from (68) into (69) yields (67). Clearly, since the manager receives the same lump sum payment T in both the healthy and distressed states, the manager's e¤ort incentive constraint is una¤ected.
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to use the solution to the sustainable e¢ ciency problem to construct the multipliers for the regulatory problem and the tax rate and show that they are positive. To do so, consider the …rst-order conditions to the sustainable e¢ ciency problem for (k; " ; p) in the current period, holding future allocations …xed:
where
so that the sustainability constraint can be written as
and are the multipliers on the implementability and sustainability constraints, and V SE denotes the continuation value associated with the sustainably e¢ cient outcome. Writing the constraint (44) as d(" ) vk; the …rst-order conditions to (45) evaluated at the sustainably e¢ cient outcomes satisfy
for some positive multipliers^ and^ on (46) and (44). Note that (73) implies that^ > 0 since U p > 0 and f p < 0. Equating the …rst-order conditions in the two problems yields
where we have used that when the constraint (46) holds with equality and g(k) = k ; then
Next we show that, under our su¢ cient conditions, the constructed multiplier^ and the tax rate are both positive. First note from the de…nition of L that L p < 0, L " > 0, and
Since f p < 0 and L p < 0; from (76) it follows that^ < . Note, next, once we show that^ > 0 it follows from (78) that > 0.
To show that^ > 0, we substitute for^ from (73) and solve for and from (71) and (70) to obtain
Substituting for U p ; f p ; U " ; and f " , simplifying, and noting that
Since " " max ; we know that H(" ) is uniformly bounded away from 1 as A H is increased.
All the other terms are also uniformly bounded. Thus, for A H su¢ ciently large, this inequality holds. Q:E:D:
H. Allowing for the Bailout Authority to Observe Individual Actions
In the body of the paper, in the history of decisions we recorded only the history of past policies and not the history of past private actions. We did so to capture the idea that private agents are competitive (or anonymous) in the sense that no individual private agent perceives that the government or other private agents will change their decisions in response to changes in that agent's actions. In Section 5 of Chari and Kehoe (1990) we proved that the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of an anonymous game coincided with the sustainable equilibria in an environment in which we recorded only the history of past policies. In a similar vein, here we show how informational assumptions in a game generate similar results for the environment in this paper.
We start by arguing that allowing for the history to record the actions of each individual agent, without making other assumptions on information and costs of observing individual actions, allows the government to induce private agents to take whatever action it desires by e¤ectively threatening each private agent with severe consequences if that particular agent deviates from the desired action.
The most trivial example that illustrates this point is a static one in which a continuum of homogeneous consumers are taxed on their labor income to provide for a given amount of government spending. Each consumer solves max u(c; l) subject to c (1 (l))l:
The government budget constraint is g = (l)l, and the resource constraint is c + g = l: Here the tax rate is individualized in that a given consumer's tax rate depends on that consumer's labor supply. Clearly, by setting
with appropriate assumptions on u, the government can engineer essentially any desired feasible labor supply l that it wants.
Note that once we allow such threats, the government can indirectly control actions that have no obvious connection to the instrument. Suppose, for example, that we modify private agents' utility to be u(c; l) + w(a) where a is some other action, say, attention to personal health. Then the government can pick a desired outcome (l ; a ) and implement it with a tax system (l; a) that equals a low number if the desired policies are followed and 1 otherwise. Clearly, such a setup gives the government an enormous amount of control over its citizens.
With these issues in mind, we now turn to our dynamic model with a bailout authority.
We show that simply allowing the government to observe individual actions, the government has so much power to control private agents that it can achieve any sustainable outcome.
We then add reasonable informational assumptions and show that our results go through essentially unchanged.
We make two minor modi…cations to our dynamic model. We assume that debt purchases are absolute rather than scaled and that the tax rate is on the absolute receipts of investors rather than on their scaled receipts. These changes lead to small di¤erences in the …rst-order conditions but have no e¤ect on the ine¢ ciency of bailout equilibria, the ine¢ ciency of orderly resolution equilibria, or the e¢ ciency of the regulatory equilibrium. As we elaborate on later, these modi…cations make the policies easier to interpret given the information structure.
We now index …rms by i to help make clear how policies are individualized. Suppose that the bailout policy of a given …rm i can depend on that …rm's contract x i but the tax rate is common to all …rms. Speci…cally, the bailout is a function of an individual …rm's size and bankruptcy cuto¤: an unscaled debt purchase o¤er D b (x i ), a renegotiated debt level indexed by " b (x i ), and a common tax rate (now on unscaled receipts by investors).
We start by showing that if all agents can observe the actions of every private agent and the government in all periods, then any desired sustainable outcome can be supported by trigger-like policies by the government. Here we focus on supporting the sustainably e¢ cient outcome, but the logic applies to any sustainable outcome.
Consider the following trigger-like strategies. We construct the strategies to ensure both private and government optimality. To construct the government strategies, let x s denote the sustainably e¢ cient contract and suppose the individualized policy is: if
then the government does not intervene on this particular contract, whereas if x i 6 = x s , then the government purchases the debt at, say, its face value A L " i and sets " b (x i ) = ". Along the equilibrium path and o¤ the path with single (measure zero) deviations, the tax rate is
Under su¢ cient conditions on v(p), it is optimal for …rms to choose x s . The reason is that each …rm understands that if it deviates, the consumption of the manager conditional on being in the distressed state will be high, but this deviation lowers the incentives for the manager to provide e¤ort enough so that ex ante surplus is lower (here is where we need a condition on v(p)). Here the government has encoded a su¢ ciently dire threat into its individualized policy so that it can induce the agents to take whatever actions it wants.
To make this policy optimal for the government, we assume that if the government deviates from such a policy, then the continuation equilibrium is the full bailout equilibrium.
These policies support the sustainably e¢ cient outcome in much the same way that in the labor tax example the policies supported the lump-sum tax outcome.
We can make reasonable assumptions on what is observed by the government and what is recorded in the history to rule out such extreme outcomes and restore our results.
The assumption on what is observed by the government at t about period t actions is the following. If the government does not pay a …xed cost , it obtains no information about individual choices, whereas if it does pay, it sees the entire vector (x it ) of actions for all agents in the current period.
The assumption on what is recorded in the past history is just the past history of average policies
where is 1 is the vector of government interventions. Note well that the history does not record whether the previous government paid the …xed cost.
Under these assumptions we have the following.
Lemma A3. The best bailout equilibrium in the model with individualized policies coincides with the best bailout equilibrium in the model with uniform policies.
Proof. We …rst show that in any equilibrium, the government will not pay the …xed cost. To see why, suppose by way of contradiction that the government pays the …xed cost in some period t. Recall that the government chooses to pay the …xed cost after the private agents have chosen their contracts. Moreover, in any equilibrium along the equilibrium path, all private agents will choose the same contract.
Suppose the government in period t deviates by not paying the …xed cost and o¤ers a uniform policy that implies the same average outcomes as under the purported equilibrium.
In the current period, the government gains by not paying the …xed cost, and, by construction, this deviation does not set o¤ a trigger so that the government's future payo¤s are una¤ected.
Hence, this deviation is pro…table and we have a contradiction.
Next, because the government does not incur the …xed cost, we can show it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to uniform policies (that are not individualized). To see this result, consider an equilibrium in which the government o¤ers an individualized policy without incurring the …xed cost, in that the government asks agents to voluntarily disclose their contracts. Clearly, in this equilibrium, all agents will pick the most desirable reported contract so that the payo¤s are identical to those if the government o¤ered a uniform policy (nonindividualized) that coincides with the individualized policy outcomes at the most desirable reports. Q:E:D:
We brie ‡y elaborate on why we modi…ed the model so that here debt purchases are absolute rather than scaled and that the tax rate is on the absolute receipts of investors rather than on their scaled receipts. When the government does not pay the …xed cost, it does not see any individual …rm's k, and thus one would need an elaborate story for how the government actually collects taxes and makes debt purchases that are scaled by g(k). When policies are levied on unscaled variables, we do not need such an elaborate story. Note: Here r D is the debt-to-value ratio in the best bailout equilibrium divided by the debt-to-value ratio in the sustainably efficient outcome while r k is the corresponding ratio of sizes. The debt-to-value ratio f /k = A L ε * g(k)/k.
